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RECENT DECISIONS
Clearly and logically, it follows that crimes committed outside of a reservation
by white persons against Indians are also punishable under the laws of the
state where such crime is committed. State v. Campbell, supra. Even a clause in
an enabling act providing that "Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States," does not deprive
the state courts of such exclusive jurisdiction over crimes on Indian reserva-
tions not committed by or against Indians. United States v. Kagama, supra. But
Donnelly v. United States, supra, held that the jurisdiction of the federal courts
over Indian reservations within state limits extends not only to crimes committed
by an Indian, but also to crimes committed on the reservation against an Indian
by a white person. An Indian who has taken land in severalty and who has
voluntarily taken up within the limits of the state his residence separate from
any tribe of Indians, and who has adopted habits of civilized life, is amenable
to the general criminal laws of the state as to all criminal offenses, although
committed within an Indian reservation, excepting only where the acts of .Con-
gress, by express provisions, in particular cases made the law of the United
States applicable to such Indians. Kitto v. State, supra; State v. Ninrod, 30 S.D.
239, 138 N.W. 377 (1912).
The federal court has jurisdiction of a crime committed against an allottee
Indian, or an allotment held in trust by the United States for the allottee, within
the trust period. United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 34 Sup. Ct 396, 58
L.Ed. 676 (1914). The federal court has jurisdiction of a crime committed on an
Indian reservation by an Indian allottee who has not received a patent from the
United States and is under the charge of a United States agent State v. Con-
don, 79 Wash. 97, 139 Pac. 871 (1914). But the United States courts have no
exclusive jurisdiction over an offense committed by one Indian against another
Indian on an Indian allotment upon the public domain outside the boundaries of
any reservation and within the limits of the state. Ex parte Moore, supra. As to
whether the federal courts have jurisdiction of offenses committed on Indian
reservations by or against Indian allottees, who, by statute, have become citizens
or have been made subject to state laws, there is an apparent lack of harmony
in the decisions. It has been decided in some cases that the federal courts have
jurisdiction. United States v. Logan, 105 Fed. 240 (C.C. Ore. 1900); State v.
Columbia George, 39 Ore. 127, 65 Pac. 604 (1901). Other cases hold that the
jurisdiction is in the state courts. Louie v. United States, 274 Fed. 47 (C.C.A.
9th 1921) ; In re Now-ge-zhuck, 69 Kan. 410, 76 Pac. 877 (1904) ; State v. Lott,
21 Idaho 646, 123 Pac. 491 (1912).
HERMAN J. GLINSKI.
Criminal Law-Misprision of Felony.-The defendant, having knowledge of
the commission of the offense of armed robbery, failed to make a disclosure of
this felony to the proper authorities and did nothing toward the apprehension
of the persons guilty of the crime. The defendant was not a police officer. He
had received no compensation for his failure to report the crime. Later the
defendant was convicted of misprision. of a felony due to his non-disclosure of
the facts of the crime.
Held, Judgment reversed. Mere silence is not sufficient to be regarded as
"concealment!' of a felony unless such, in purpose, is in aid of an offender and
of such nature as to constitute one an accessory after the fact. Short of this,
the old time common law offense of misprision of a felony is not now a substan-
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tive crime and not adopted by the Michigan constitution, because wholly un-
suited to American criminal law and procedure as used in this state.
However, the dissenting opinion held that inasmuch as Michigan had
adopted all the existing common law which was not repugnant to the constitu-
tion, and the legislature having passed no law forbidding the prosecution for mis-
prision of a felony, the court is obliged to convict the defendant here. People v.
Lefkovitz, 293 N.W. 642 (Mich. 1940).
Misprision of felony is defined as follows: "One to be responsible for a
crime committed by another must in some way make a contribution thereto from
his will. Yet without such contribution, he can commit a crime of his own in
respect of the other's crime. So that if while another is perpetrating treason or
a felony into which his will does not enter, he stands by without using the
means in his power to prevent it; or if, after it has been done in his absence,
he is-made aware of the fact, yet neither discloses it to the authorities nor does
anything to bring the offender to justice the law holds him to be guilty of a
breach of duty due to the community and the government, and for this breach
punishes him. The name which professional usage has given to the breach is
misprision of treason or felony." 1 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW, 9th Ed., §
720.
Misprision, that is, failure to use the means that one has to prevent a felony
committed in his presence, was seriously regarded in Egyptian law, for who-
ever had it in his power to save the life of a citizen and neglected that duty,
was punished as his murderer. 1 BISHOP, op cit. supra, § 718. Though prosecu-
tions for misprision were extremely rare in England (Williams v. Bayley, L. R.
1 H. L. 200), one English writer has indicated that every man was bound to
use all possible lawful means to prevent a felony. 1 HALE, P. C., 484-489. Black-
stone speaks of this same duty but asserts that one may not resort to killing
in order to prevent a felony unless the crime itself is punishable with death.
4 BL. CoMx.* 181.
In the United States, Alabama requires the prevention of a felony by force,
if necessary. Suell v. Derricott, 161 Ala. 259, 49 So. 895 (1909). Arkansas has
declared it a common law misdemeanor not to prevent the commission of a
felony "by the extinguishment of the felon's existence, if need be." Carpenter v.
State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 S.W. 900 (1896). Kentucky has upheld the use of a spring-
gun to prevent any type of felonious entry upon the principle that every man is
bound to use all possible lawful means to prevent a felony. Gray v. Co-rnbs, 30
Ken. 478, 7 J. J. Marshall 478 (1832). Michigan, the state in which the principal
case arose, has imposed a duty upon its citizens to prevent the commission of a
felony, but will allow killing of the felon only in cases of violent or forcible
crimes. Pond v. The People, 8 Mich. 150 (1860).
The principal case, however, is concerned only with misprision of felony
wherein there is concealment and failure to report the fact of a crime. Here
misprision of felony is not to be confused with compounding a felony. "Mis-
prision of felony consist in a mere concealment of the offense or a procuring of
the concealment thereof, while in compounding of felony, or theft-bote, one
takes his goods again or other amends not to prosecute." 1 HAWKINS, P. C. 59,
par 5.
Vermont and Delaware have had convictions for misprision of a felony, both
asserting that the common law offense of misprision of a felony was definitely a
part of the present law of their respective states. State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67
Atl. 533 (1907) ; State v. Biddle, 124 Atl. 804 (Del. 1923). In the Vermont case,
supra, the prosecution was for concealment of treason. The court asserted that
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as treason was a crime more heinous than other felonies, so misprision of treason
was a worse offense than mere misprision of a felony. This emphasized the dis-
tinction made at common law between misprision of treason and misprision of
felony. 9 LORD HAILSHAM, HALsBURy's LAWS OF ENGLAND, 2d ed. 354. The Dela-
ware case of State v. Biddle charged and convicted the defendant of misprision
of felony for neither preventing nor reporting the crime of robbery.
Section 856 of the Revised Statutes of Louisiana reads: "If any person hav-
ing knowledge of the commission of any crime punishable with death, or im-
prisonment at hard labor, shall conceal and not disclose it to some committing
magistrate or district attorney, on conviction he shall be fined . . . " One defend-
ant in Louisiana was charged with being an accessory after the fact and, under
this statute, with misprision of the crime of murder. The felony itself had been
committed in Mississippi. The demurrer to the misprision charge was sustained
on the ground that the proper venue of the offense of misprision of felony is
the place where the disclosure should be made, i.e., Mississippi. The case also
asserted that the noticeable lack of misprision prosecutions is due to the fact
that, in the modern acceptation of the term, misprision of felony is almost if
not identically the same offense as that of an accessory after the fact. State v.
Graham, 190 La. 669, 182 So. 711 (1938).
Both Delaware and Vermont, on the other hand, hold that misprision of
felony is without such previous concert or assistance of the felon as will make
the concealor an accessory before or after the fact. State v. Wilson, .supra;
State v. Biddle, supra.
A felon cannot be guilty of misprision of his own felony. Jones v. State, 14
Ind. 120 (1860). Where the accused had lived with a woman for 5y2 years in
open fornication, but professing that the woman was his wife, a conviction for
misprision of a felony was reversed on the grounds that the Indiana misprision
statute must have meant the concealment of a crime, unconnected with the fact
that the accused was the guilty perpetrator. Robinson v. State, 57 Ind. 113 (1877).
Concealment of certain felonies is a federal offense: "Whoever, having
knowledge of the actual commission of the crime of murder or other felony
cognizable by the courts of the United States, conceals and does not as soon
as may be disclose and make known the same to some one of the judges or other
persons in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined
not more than $500, or imprisoned not more than three years, or both." 18 USCA
251. In Bratton v. United States, 73 F. (2nd) 795, (C.C.A. 10th, 1934), though
the defendant had accepted $300 not to reveal the felony of illegal possession of
liquor, a judgment of conviction was reversed on the ground that the defendant
had not performed an affirmative act of concealment. The court interpreted the
words of the Statute, "conceal and," as implying some act in addition to con-
cealment of the felony, such as suppression of the evidence harboring of the
criminal, intimidation of witnesses, or other positive act designed to conceal
from the authorities the fact that a crime had been committed.
In Neal v. United States, 102 F. (2d) 643, (C.C.A. 8th, 1939) a conviction
was reversed on the ground of insufficient proof that the defendant had per-
formed an affirmative act of concealment. The court stated the elements of
misprision of felony as follows: (1) a felony has been committed; (2) the
defendant has full knowledge of that fact; (3) defendant fails to notify the
authorities; (4) defendant takes affirmative steps to conceal the crime. All four
elements must be present before there can be conviction for misprision of felony.
United States v. Farrar, 38 F. (2d) 515, (W.D. Mass., 1930) ; Marbury v. Brook,
7 Wheat 556, (U.S. 1822). RAYMOND HUEVLER.
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